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Technology Gap Navigator: Emerging Design of
Biometric-Enabled Risk Assessment Machines
Shawn Eastwood1Ken Lai2Svetlana Yanushkevich3Richard Guest4Vlad Shmerko5
Abstract: This paper reports the Technology Gap (TG) navigator, a novel tool for individual risk as-
sessment in the layered security infrastructure. It is motivated by the practical need of the biometric-
enabled security systems design. The tool helps specify the conditions for bridging the identified
TGs. The input data for the TG navigator includes 1) a causal description of the TG, 2) statistics
regarding the available resources and performances, and 3) the required performance. The output in-
cludes generated probabilistic conditions, and the corresponding technology requirements for bridg-
ing the targeted TG.
Keywords: technology gap, causal model, biometrics, risks
1 Introduction and motivation
Technology Gap (TG) navigation is a mechanism for 1) the analysis of the difference be-
tween required and available technologies, and 2) generating certain conditions for bridg-
ing this TG, given a design scenario or a task. For example, a resent study [GNQ17] ad-
dresses the state-of-the-art in the identification of non-cooperative individuals, such as
surveillance in mass-transit systems. Another example of a TG [Nu14] involves the op-
erational performance of biometric-based recognition in border control systems, which is
significantly lower than a “theoretical” performance. This scenario can be represented by
a model at a reasonable level of abstraction and conditions for filling or bridging this gap
can be found. This is the core idea of TG navigation, and emerging design approaches.
In this paper, we provide an example of TG navigation for designing a future generation
of biometric-enabled risk assessment machines. A particular case of such machines is
known as Automated Border Control machines [Do16]. The TG related problems include
1) TG identification, and 2) TG bridging. In particular, approaches to the TG analysis at a
high level of abstraction include the following:
• Smart Border doctrine [EU14]. The TG is identified by a set of indicators from the
field of biometrics, decision-making, intelligent computing, risk assessment, and
privacy protection. In the TG analysis of the checkpoint of the future [In14], the ba-
sic TG drivers are defined in terms of traveler risk assessment, identity management,
behavior analysis, and alternative measures for unpredictability.
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• Public security. In a layered security concept [CHR15], the TG addresses an optimal
distribution of layers over limited resources. Predictability is a cornerstone of public
security [Li14]. The TG analysis aims at the reliable prediction of various actions.
Bridging the TGs is a challenging problem that has been studied in the following areas:
• forensics and biometrics [JR15];
• forensics and biometric-enabled watchlist screening [ANH18, La17];
• deception and biometrics [Ab17];
• balancing privacy, security, and cost [EU14].
Examples of TG bridging at a low level of abstraction include the meta-analysis of attacks
[Bi17]. The TGs are identified in detecting a deception in interview supporting machines
[RZ14, La17]. Self-service technologies for air-travelers such as reservation and payment
for tickets online, checking-in over the Internet or mobile phones, picking up boarding
passes at airport kiosks, and baggage drop-off [KS18] are used as additional sources for
traveler risk assessment. Some formalized approaches are based on deriving the TG mea-
sures in terms of categories [Pa08], as well as technological drivers [Ha05] such as: (1)
Opportunistic driver (whether or not a suitable signatures can be developed), (2) Mature
driver (whether or not a suitable deployment scenario can be developed), and (3) Devel-
opment driver (whether or not a suitable measurement method can be developed).
The TG navigator proposed in this paper explores these three drivers using the machine
reasoning model known as a Bayesan Network (BN). In our approach to biometric-enabled
system design, Gap analysis involves the comparison of the actual performance with the
desired one, aiming to identify steps needed to achieve the desired performance. TG anal-
ysis addresses a difference in the performances of the available technology and the desired
performance. This difference can be described in terms of indicators, or categories, as well
as using probabilistic metrics (as is the case in this paper). TG template is a formalized
mechanism of the TG analysis. TG navigator is a machine reasoning model that generates
conditions for achieving a desired performance of a biometric-enabled system.
2 The TG navigator as an inference engine
A theoretical framework of the proposed TG navigator includes machine reasoning, also
known as inference. We implement an inference engine as a multi-metric probabilistic
causal network. For the TG analysis, we also utilize techniques adopted from sensitivity
analysis [BP16], such as the partitioning of the networks and probability propagation in
sub-nets [Ca17], as well as methodology of the TG analysis [Ha05]. Sensitivity analysis
related to biometric system design was studied in [Le13]. It assesses a biometric model
via determining the relative importance of various factors. Our approach is different from
[Le13] as follows:
1. We operate at a higher level of system abstraction rather than aiming at particular
“improvements”.
2. We use probabilistic sensitivity analysis that assumes that information is represented
in the form of probability distributions, either joint or marginal.
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3. For modeling, we use a causal network instead of a set of factors.
The essence of the proposed TG navigator is a uniform modeling platform which includes
the following two components: (a) a graphical representation of any given scenario in the
form of a causal network, and (b) a mechanism of uncertainty inference in the following
metrics: probabilities, and fuzzy probabilities [Re09]. Using the probability metric and the
Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs), the causal networks are referred to as Bayesian
Networks.
3 Demonstrative experiments
Consider a scenario where a subject is to be compared against a watchlist. In Fig. 1, the
TG navigator scenario is represented by a causal network where:
W: The watchlist node denotes whether or not the subject is actually on the watchlist
(state w1 =‘On List’) or not (state w2 =‘Off List’).
T: The threshold node denotes a number that is assigned to a recognition system to deter-
mine whether a photo is accepted (positive) or rejected (negative). Higher thresholds
yield less false acceptances but more false rejections. There are 3 thresholds in this
example: t1 =‘0’, t2 =‘5’ and t3 =‘10’.
S: The decision strategy node represents the methods of combining the results of match-
ing for multiple probe images. In the s1 =OR strategy, each probe result is returned
as positive if its score is greater than the threshold, else negative. In the s2 =‘Vote’
strategy, each probe casts one positive vote if its matching score is greater than the
threshold, otherwise it casts a negative vote. The s3 =‘Average’ strategy sums the
scores of the entire probe set, and then divides it by the number of probes yielding an
average score among the probe set. If the average score is greater than the threshold
then the entire set is treated as positive.
P: The number of probes equates to the simulated number (one to five p1, p2, p3, p4, p5)
of snapshots of the subject.
C: The correctness of the recognition system: c1 =‘True’ defines the condition where the
system correctly identifies a subject on the watchlist (true acceptance) and correctly
rejects subject who are not on the watchlist (true rejection). c2 =‘False’ defines the
condition where the system identifies subject who are not on the watchlist as being
on it (false acceptance), and the wanted subjects as not being on the watchlist (false
rejection).
M: The matching node represents authentication results. m1 denotes the scenario where
a subject is identified as being on the watchlist either correctly or incorrectly. m2
denotes the scenario where a subject is not identified as such.
The initial data that populates the CPTs is real or near real. In particular, we used the
performance statistic of automated border control reported in [Nu14], as well as approx-
imations caused by technical solutions [EU14, Do16]. The data used for the experiment
is the FRGC 2.0 database which contains 568 subjects with a total of 39,328 images.
Face matching was performed using the Verilook software package fromNeurotechnology.
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When probability distributions are used, the CPTs are assigned to each node as shown in
Figure 1 (the CPT for nodeM is the same as in Section 3.1, and node C CPT is not shown).
Watchlist
W On List Off List
Pr(W ) 0.0028 0.9972
Threshold
T ‘0’ ‘5’ ‘10’
Pr(T ) 0.3 0.3 0.3
Decision Strategies
S Or Vote Average
Pr(S) 0.3 0.3 0.3
Number of Probes
P P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Pr(P) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Fig. 1: The TG navigator scenario: specifying conditions for improving traveler risk assessment us-
ing biometric-enabled watchlist screening. The TG factors are identified in the causal network for
traveler risk assessment using biometric-enabled watchlist and e-ID validation.
3.1 The TG formalization in terms of probabilities
Biometric-enabled watchlists are not used in common practice of rapid traveler risk as-
sessment using automated border control except for some pilot projects. The main reason
is that contemporary biometric-based profiling technologies significantly decrease the per-
formance of automated gates. Detailed analyses of such scenarios are reported, in partic-
ular, in [Do16]. Specifically, technology challenges address the False Match Rate (FMR)
and False Non-Match Rate (FNMR). The FMR is the probability that a match is invalid:
Pr(w2|m1), which is the proportion of invalid matches (the traveler is not on the watchlist
W = w2) among all matches (the traveler is matched on the watchlist, either correctly or
incorrectlyM =m1). The FNMR is the probability that a non-match is invalid: Pr(w1|m2),
which is the proportion of invalid non-matches (the traveler is on the watchlist W = w1)
among all non-matches (the traveler is not matched to the watchlist, either correctly or
incorrectly M = m2). Both the FMR and FNMR affect security and privacy: in the case
of a false match, an innocent person will be mistakenly directed to manual control; and a
false non-match results in entry to a country being granted to a person of interest without
manual control. Conceptually, the solution to this problem is known as an improvement to
the quality of biometric traits [Do16]. Hence, the FMR and FNMR are indicators of the
TG. The problem of bridging the TG can be formulated in terms of the TG navigation over
related parameters and indicators.
Definition 1. The TG (Technology Gap) is defined as the goals for the accuracy of
various elements of a biometric enabled service required to reach specific goals in the
posterior probabilities/belief values for certain target scenarios. In the example covered
in this paper, the technology gap refers to the target correctness rates required to satisfy
upper bounds on the FMR and FNMR.
Technology Gap Navigator 5
Definition 2. The TG navigator of a given scenario is defined as the process (metric, al-
gorithm) of determining the technology gap that must be spanned to address the scenario.
Definition 3. Bridging the TG is defined as the act of upgrading the existing technology
to achieve the accuracy goals.
The TG conditions specification: The threshold T , decision strategy S, and the number of
probes P will be assumed to be arbitrarily fixed.
The TG goal: We will be interested in:
1. the correctness rate for watchlist travelers x1 = Pr(c1|w1,T,S,P), and
2. the correctness rate for non-watchlist travelers x2 = Pr(c1|w2,T,S,P)
that will achieve a desired FMR y1(x1,x2) = Pr(w2|T,S,P,m1) and a FNMR y2(x1,x2) =
Pr(w1|T,S,P,m2) of at most 10%. These correctness rates x1 and x2 establish the TG that
must be cleared to achieve the desired FMR and FNMR. The tables below contains the
necessary data to calculate y1,y2 from x1,x2. The uncertainty inference in performed using
a software package that is available upon request.
Watchlist
W On List Off List
Pr(W ) 0.0028 0.9972
Correctness
C True False
Pr(C|w1,T,S,P) x1 1− x1
Pr(C|w2,T,S,P) x2 1− x2
Pr(M|W,C) Matching
W C Match Non-match
On List True 1 0
On List False 0 1
Off List True 0 1
Off List False 1 0
The (x1,x2) pairs of interest are those such that y1(x1,x2)≤ 0.1 and y2(x1,x2)≤ 0.1. The
set/region of (x1,x2) pairs where y1(x1,x2) ≤ 0.1 are referred to as R1, and the set/region
of (x1,x2) pairs where y2(x1,x2) ≤ 0.1 form R2. To determine an optimal x1 and x2, a re-
cursive binary search will be used. The regions R1 and R2 can be exactly computed by
solving a linear system of equations. The table below lists y1 = Pr(w2|T,S,P,m1) and y2 =
Pr(w1|T,S,P,m2) given various values for x1=Pr(c1|w1,T,S,P) and x2=Pr(c1|w2,T,S,P).
Initially, x1 and x2 are restricted to the set of values {0.0,0.5,1.0}.
x1 x2 y1 y2
0.00 0.00 1.000000 1.000000
0.00 0.50 1.000000 0.005584
0.00 1.00 0/0 0.002800
0.50 0.00 0.998598 1.000000
0.50 0.50 0.997200 0.002800
x1 x2 y1 y2
0.50 1.00 0.000000 0.001402
1.00 0.00 0.997200 0/0
1.00 0.50 0.994416 0.000000
1.00 1.00 0.000000 0.000000
Decision: We observe that
1. the ranges [0.00,0.50]× [0.50,1.00] and [0.50,1.00]× [0.50,1.00] are partially con-
tained by R1.
2. the ranges [0.00,0.50]× [0.50,1.00] and [0.50,1.00]× [0.50,1.00] are completely
contained by R2, and [0.50,1.00]× [0.00,0.50] is partially contained by R2.
After a range of interest has been identified as the location of the TG x1 and x2, the range
can be further divided into 4 regions that can be explored recursively. If TG goals x1 and
x2 are chosen from a square that is:
6 S. Eastwood, K. Lai, S. Yanushkevich, R. Guest and V. Shmerko
1. completely contained by R2, then the FNMR is guaranteed to be at most 0.1.
2. partially contained by R2, then the FNMR may be at most 0.1 but not guaranteed.
After the TG x1 (the desired correctness for subjects on the watchlist) and x2 (the desired
correctness for ones not on the watchlist) has been chosen to improve the FMR and FNMR
to at most 10%, the next problem is improving the existing technology to span the chosen
TG. Such improvements may include adjustments to the deep learning approach to train
the feature extractor, and hardware and infrastructure improvements such as better lighting
etc.
3.2 The TG formalization in terms of fuzzy probabilities
The fuzzy probabilities that will be used in this paper are based on [BDT03, Re09]. The
fuzzy numbers have the form (l,c,u) where l and u are the lower and upper bounds of the
membership function respectively, and c is the center value. Specifically, the membership
function ψ :R→ [0,1] is triangular: ψ(x) = 0 for x≤ l, x−l
c−l for l≤ x≤ c,
u−x
u−c for c≤ x≤ u,
and 0 for u≤ x. It should also be noted that the lower and upper bounds of the membership
function, l and u respectively, may fall outside of the interval [0,1]. In this case, these
bounds help to shape the membership function inside of the interval [0,1], but do not enable
any point probability to exist outside of the interval [0, 1]. Using the same TG example,
the TG goals, x1 = Pr(c1|w1,T,S,P) and x2 = Pr(c1|w2,T,S,P), and the FMR and FNMR,
y1(x1,x2) = Pr(w2|T,S,P,m1) and y2(x1,x2) = Pr(w1|T,S,P,m2), are now triangular fuzzy
numbers. The tables below contain the necessary data to calculate y1,y2 from x1,x2.
Watchlist
W On List Off List
Pr(W ) (0,0.0028,0.1028) (0.8972,0.9972,1)
Correctness
C True False
Pr(C|w1,T,S,P) x1 (1,1,1)− x1
Pr(C|w2,T,S,P) x2 (1,1,1)− x2
Pr(M|W,C) Matching
W C Match Non-match
‘On List’ ‘True’ (1,1,1) (0,0,0)
‘On List’ ‘False’ (0,0,0) (1,1,1)
‘Off List’ ‘True’ (0,0,0) (1,1,1)
‘Off List’ ‘False’ (1,1,1) (0,0,0)
Decision:
1. The (x1,x2) pairs of interest are those that yield a pair (y1,y2) that satisfies condi-
tions f1(y1) and f2(y2).
2. f1(y1) is an unknown condition which holds when y1 is “small”. f2(y2) is an un-
known condition which holds when y2 is “small”.
3. The set of (x1,x2) pairs where f1(y1(x1,x2)) holds will be referred to as R1, and the
set of (x1,x2) pairs where f2(y2(x1,x2)) holds will be referred to as R2.
Table below lists y1 = Pr(w2|T,S,P,m1) and y2 = Pr(w1|T,S,P,m2) given various values
for x1 = Pr(c1|w1,T,S,P) and x2 = Pr(c1|w2,T,S,P). x1 and x2 are restricted to the set
of values {(0.0,0.0,0.5),(0.0,0.5,1.0),(0.5,1.0,1.0)}. These 3 values are fuzzy versions
of the values {0.0,0.5,1.0}. After the TG has been determined, the same approaches can
be used to bridge the TG as when point probabilities were used. However, because fuzzy
probabilities are being used, the requirements set by the TG are not as strict as when
point probabilities are being used. It is also important note that using fuzzy probabilities
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x1 x2 y1 y2
(0.00,0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.00,0.50) (0.43,1.00,2.23) (0.00,1.00,+∞)
(0.00,0.00,0.50) (0.00,0.50,1.00) (0.00,1.00,+∞) (0.00,0.01,+∞)
(0.00,0.00,0.50) (0.50,1.00,1.00) (0.00,0/0,+∞) (0.00,0.00,0.23)
(0.00,0.50,1.00) (0.00,0.00,0.50) (0.41,1.00,2.23) (0.00,1.00,+∞)
(0.00,0.50,1.00) (0.00,0.50,1.00) (0.00,1.00,+∞) (0.00,0.00,+∞)
(0.00,0.50,1.00) (0.50,1.00,1.00) (0.00,0.00,+∞) (0.00,0.00,0.23)
(0.50,1.00,1.00) (0.00,0.00,0.50) (0.41,1.00,2.23) (0.00,0/0,+∞)
(0.50,1.00,1.00) (0.00,0.50,1.00) (0.00,0.99,+∞) (0.00,0.00,+∞)
(0.50,1.00,1.00) (0.50,1.00,1.00) (0.00,0.00,+∞) (0.00,0.00,0.12)
to navigate the TG is not the same as sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis aims to
determine the impact of uncertainty, which is distinct from navigating the TG which aims
to compute the TG while accounting for uncertainty.
4 Summary and conclusion
The complexity of biometric-enabled systems for rapid individual risk assessment in mass-
transit hubs is the main motivation for the emerging development of the TG navigator. In
a complex security system, the designed and the achieved performance can be signifi-
cantly different. To avoid or mitigate this effect, advanced modeling techniques such ma-
chine reasoning should be chosen. The proposed TG navigator addresses this problem. The
framework of the TG navigator includes advances in recognition, probabilistic modeling,
computational intelligence, and sensitivity analysis. Our development and experimental
testing of the TG navigator results in the following conclusions:
1. The TG navigator provides an assessment of risk for the scenarios in which perfor-
mance requirements are at the critical level of technological possibilities.
2. The TG navigator helps identify the conditions for bridging the TGs when designing
the systems under technological constraints. The mechanism for such analysis is the
machine reasoning based on a tailored analysis of probability distributions, through
Bayesian inference.
The uncertainty metrics that were the subject of the examples are point probability distri-
butions and fuzzy probability distributions. It is important to note that other uncertainty
metrics such as probability intervals and Dempster-Shafer models can be utilized.
References
[Ab17] Abouelenien, Mo.; Pe´rez-Rosas, V.; Mihalcea, R.; Burzo, M.: Detecting deceptive behavior
via integration of discriminative features from multiple modalities. IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, 12(5):1042–1055, 2017.
[ANH18] Almudhahka, N.; Nixon, M.; Hare, J.: Semantic Face Signatures: Recognizing and Re-
trieving Faces by Verbal Descriptions. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, 13(3):706–716, 2018.
[BDT03] Baldwin, J.; Di Tomaso, E.: Inference and learning in fuzzy Bayesian networks. In: IEEE
International Conference on Fuzzy Systems. volume 1, pp. 630–635, 2003.
8 S. Eastwood, K. Lai, S. Yanushkevich, R. Guest and V. Shmerko
[Bi17] Biggio, B.; Fumera, G.; Marcialis, G.; Roli, F.: Statistical meta-analysis of presentation at-
tacks for secure multibiometric systems. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine
intelligence, 39(3):561–575, 2017.
[BP16] Borgonovo, E.; Plischke, E.: Sensitivity analysis: a review of recent advances. European
Journal of Operational Research, 248(3):869–887, 2016.
[Ca17] Castillo, E.; Grande, Z.; Mora, E.; Lo, H.; Xu, X.: Complexity reduction and sensitivity
analysis in road probabilistic safety assessment Bayesian network models. Computer-Aided
Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 32(7):546–561, 2017.
[CHR15] Chatterjee, S.; Hora, S.; Rosoff, H.: Portfolio analysis of layered security measures. Risk
Analysis, 35(3):459–475, 2015.
[Do16] Donida Labati, R.; Genovese, A.; Mun˜oz, E.; Piuri, V.; Scotti, F.; Sforza, G.: Biomet-
ric Recognition in Automated Border Control: A Survey. ACM Computing Surveys,
49(2):A:1–A:39, 2016.
[EU14] EU European Commission B-1049: , Technical Study on Smart Borders, 2014.
[GNQ17] Grother, P.; Ngan, M.; Quinn, G.: , Face in video evaluation (FIVE) Face recognition of
non-cooperative subjects, Report 817, 2017.
[Ha05] Hartman, J.; Atkinson, D.; Lind, M.; Maughan, A.; Kelly, J.: Technology Gap Analysis for
the Detection of Process Signatures Using Less Than Remote Methods. Technical report,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (US), 2005.
[In14] International Air Transport Association: , Checkpoint of the future. Executive summary. 4th
Proof., 2014.
[JR15] Jain, A.; Ross, A.: Bridging the gap: from biometrics to forensics. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B,
370(1674):20140254, 2015.
[KS18] K., Ueda; S., Kurahashi: Agent-based self-service technology adoption model for air-
travelers: Exploring best operational practices. Frontiers in Physics, 6:1–14, 2018.
[La17] Lai, K.; Yanushkevich, S.; Shmerko, V.; Eastwood, S.: Bridging the gap between forensics
and biometric-enabled watchlists for e-borders. IEEE Computational Intelligence Maga-
zine, 12(1):16–28, 2017.
[Le13] Lee, Y.; Filliben, J.; Micheals, R.; Phillips, J.: Sensitivity analysis for biometric systems:
A methodology based on orthogonal experiment designs. Computer Vision and Image
Understanding, 117(5):532–550, 2013.
[Li14] Liu, Y.; Hansen, M.; Gupta, G.; Malik, W.; Jung, Y.: Predictability impacts of airport surface
automation. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 44:128–145, 2014.
[Nu14] Nuppency, M.: , Automated border control – state of play and latest developments, Federal
Office for Information Security, 2014.
[Pa08] Palmer, A.: Criteria to evaluate automated personal identification mechanisms. Computers
& Security, 27(7-8):260–284, 2008.
[Re09] Ren, J.; Jenkinson, I.; Wang, J.; Xu, DL.; Yang, JB.: An offshore risk analysis method
using fuzzy Bayesian network. Journal of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering,
131(4):041101, 2009.
[RZ14] Rajoub, B.; Zwiggelaar, R.: Thermal facial analysis for deception detection. IEEE transac-
tions on information forensics and security, 9(6):1015–1023, 2014.
